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Summary
Current health reform bills in both houses of Congress 
include a barrier that excludes many lower-income workers 
with an offer of employer-sponsored health insurance from 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies, which they would have 
been able to use toward the purchase of exchange-based 
health insurance coverage if they did not have an employer 
offer. We investigate the effectiveness of employee choice 
vouchers, such as that proposed by Senator Wyden and 
included in the Senate bill as passed, in making health care 
more affordable for such families. The voucher concept 
would allow certain employees to use their employers’ 
contributions toward health insurance to help pay for 
coverage in an exchange, permitting them to access federal 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies for which they might 
be eligible. We also consider concerns that the provision 
of such vouchers could cause adverse selection in the 
remaining employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) market, 
potentially leading to a decline in employer coverage.
We simulate the implications of two types of voucher 
programs: one based on Senator Wyden’s proposal and 
a second option that would expand the availability of 
vouchers to everyone with incomes in the subsidy eligibility 
range. We find that:
• Employee choice vouchers make health coverage 
dramatically more affordable for the low-income families 
who take advantage of them. For example, under 
a Wyden-style reform, the median total health care 
expenses (premium plus out-of-pocket costs) for families 
using a voucher would fall from just over 12 percent of 
income when buying an employer’s plan to less than 3 
percent of income when using an employer voucher to 
buy exchange-based subsidized coverage; 
• The expanded voucher program would increase 
insurance coverage very modestly;
• Vouchers would not change government or employer 
spending significantly;
• Voucher programs have little effect on overall employer 
spending on health care. Even under the expanded 
voucher program, the change in employer spending 
would be less than 1 percent;
• Either voucher program would have very little effect  
on ESI premiums, but would reduce the number of 
people covered by ESI outside the exchange. Neither  
of these effects is large enough to threaten the integrity 
of the ESI market.
Introduction
Current health reform bills in both 
houses of Congress1 include premium 
and cost-sharing subsidies2 that could 
be used by those with incomes between 
133 and 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level (FPL) to make health 
insurance policies purchased through 
the new health insurance exchanges 
more affordable.3 However, both bills 
also include a barrier that would prevent 
many low-income workers with an offer 
of employer-sponsored health insurance 
(ESI) from accessing the subsidies that 
they could receive if they did not have 
an employer offer of coverage. 
Both bills structure premium subsidies 
available for exchange coverage as caps 
on the share of income an individual or 
family would be required to contribute 
toward the cost of their coverage; these 
caps increase with income and are only 
available for exchange-based coverage. 
Under the House bill, these percentage 
income caps range from 1.5 to 12 
percent of income; under the Senate 
bill they range from 2 to 9.8 percent of 
income. Both bills also provide subsidies 
to lower out-of-pocket cost-sharing 
burdens for low-income families. These 
subsidies are available to income-
eligible individuals without employer 
sponsored offers in a straight-forward 
way. However, a modest-income worker 
with an employer offer may face higher 
financial burdens than their counterpart 
without such an offer. 
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Specifically, under the House bill (H.R. 
3962), in order to qualify for subsidized 
exchange coverage, an employee’s share 
of the lowest cost ESI premium offered 
to them must be more than 12 percent 
of their income. Under the Senate 
bill (H.R. 3590), that threshold was 
originally 9.8 percent of income. Senator 
Wyden proposed a system of employee 
choice vouchers as a way of making 
health insurance more affordable to 
some of those prevented from accessing 
subsidies due to these thresholds. These 
employee choice vouchers were added 
to the final Senate bill as passed through 
the Manager’s Amendment. We evaluate 
two voucher policies, one based on 
the Wyden amendment and the other 
broader in scope, that would expand the 
availability of vouchers to everyone with 
incomes in the subsidy eligibility range.
As is well known, most employers who 
offer insurance to their workers make 
a substantial contribution to the cost 
of coverage (on average, 80 and 72 
percent for single and family policies, 
respectively). 4 These contributions are 
not taxed as income to the employees. 
An employee choice voucher would 
allow someone offered ESI to take 
the amount their employer would 
contribute if they enrolled in the firm’s 
plan and use it instead to buy a policy 
from an exchange. The worker would 
then have access to any premium and 
cost-sharing subsidies for which he 
or she might still be eligible after the 
employer’s contribution was taken  
into account. 
Such a program would have an effect 
not only on the employees receiving 
vouchers, but on those not eligible. This 
is because those workers choosing to 
purchase insurance in the exchange 
would not be in the firm’s health 
insurance risk pool, the group of 
employees whose costs are used to 
determine ESI premiums. If the workers 
making use of the voucher option tend 
to have lower health care costs than 
those remaining in the firm’s insurance 
plan, premiums in the employer’s 
plan could increase, an effect known 
as adverse selection.5 Also, many 
commercial insurers, particularly those 
selling coverage in the small group 
market, set a minimum share of a firm’s 
workers that must enroll in ESI, so if  
too many workers take vouchers, 
the firm could be forced to drop ESI 
coverage altogether.
In this brief we examine the effects of 
vouchers on firms and employees. How 
much more affordable do vouchers 
make health insurance for those with 
ESI offers? Do vouchers increase the 
number of insured? How much will 
employers spend on vouchers? How 
much adverse selection or loss of ESI 
occurs as a result?
The Reforms Simulated 
Under the Wyden employee choice 
voucher proposal, employees in all firm 
sizes would be eligible for a voucher 
(single or family) if the contribution 
they would be asked to make toward 
minimum essential coverage offered by 
their employer was between 8 and 9.8 
percent of their income. The amount 
of the voucher, paid by the employer, 
would be the amount the employer 
would have contributed if the employee 
had enrolled in the highest-cost plan 
offered by their employer. The value of 
the voucher would be deducted from the 
premium of a plan purchased through the 
exchange. If the voucher amount was 
greater than the exchange premium, the 
employee would receive the difference as 
additional (taxable) income. If the voucher 
did not cover the full cost of exchange 
coverage, the premium subsidy test 
would be applied. In addition to premium 
subsidies, qualifying employees would 
have access to cost-sharing subsidies and 
reduced cost-sharing limits.6
For compatibility with other recent 
policy briefs using The Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM, described below), 
we use the House bill as our base of 
comparison of the voucher options.7 
While the highest percent of income 
in the Senate bill’s subsidy schedule is 
9.8 percent, the highest in the House 
bill’s schedule is 12 percent. As a 
consequence, the Wyden-style voucher 
proposal modeled here is modified 
such that those workers with an ESI 
coverage contribution requirement 
of 8 to 12 percent of income would 
be eligible for the voucher option. In 
addition, eligibility is limited to the 
subsidy-eligible working population, 
those whose family income is below 400 
percent of the Federal poverty line.8
An Example of an Employee Choice Voucher
The following example illustrates how vouchers work. Suppose a family of three has one working parent and their income 
is 133 percent of the Federal poverty level, about $24,000 a year. The employer offers insurance. The total ESI premium 
for a family policy is $12,000, but the employer pays 80 percent of the cost, leaving $2,400 for the working parent to pay. 
This is 10 percent of the family’s income, so they would not be eligible for any premium or cost-sharing subsidies under 
the House bill. Unless the family is granted a hardship exemption from the mandate, they would either have to buy this 
policy or an unsubsidized family policy in the exchange with an annual premium of, say, $9,000. If they are granted an 
exemption, they may choose to go uninsured rather than pay at least 10 percent of their income in premiums.
We now introduce a voucher program. The amount of the voucher would be 80 percent of the total ESI premium, $9,600. 
This could be applied to the family premium in the exchange. The family could thus get the exchange policy at no 
premium, as well as a $600 refund. Also, the family would be eligible for the highest level of cost-sharing subsidies, so their 
out-of-pocket health care costs would be lower with the exchange plan than with the employer’s plan.
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Our second simulation extends 
eligibility for the voucher option to all 
workers with family incomes in the 
subsidy eligibility range: 133 to 400 
percent of the FPL. This option would 
provide significantly more workers  
with access to vouchers and exchange-
based subsidies than would the  
Wyden-style option.
Methods
To estimate the effects of the reform 
options, we use the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM).9 HIPSM simulates the 
decisions of businesses and individuals 
in response to policy changes, such 
as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for 
the purchase of health insurance, 
and insurance market reforms. The 
model provides estimates of changes 
in government and private costs, 
premiums, rates of employer offers of 
coverage, and health insurance coverage 
resulting from specified reforms.10 For 
this analysis, all reforms are simulated  
as if they were fully implemented in 
2009, and results are presented for that 
single year.
Two important aspects of employee 
choice vouchers are easy to overlook. 
First, the structure of the most 
expensive insurance plan offered by the 
employer may differ substantially from 
the plan purchased in the exchange. 
For example, comprehensive ESI plans 
vary considerably, but estimates of their 
average actuarial value (the average 
share of covered services reimbursed 
by the insurance plan) are generally 
between 76 and 80 percent. Plans 
offered by large firms are typically 
more generous than average. Second, 
the premiums of the ESI plans will in 
general be based on a smaller risk pool 
than the exchange. If the plans and risk 
pools involved in the voucher decision 
are sufficiently different from that in the 
exchange, the resulting incentives may 
have undesirable disruptive effects on 
the ESI market. For example, vouchers 
based upon a high cost firm’s premiums 
could encourage younger and healthier 
workers to leave firm coverage for 
exchange coverage, compromising the 
stability of the firm’s risk pool. 
HIPSM explicitly models employer 
behavior. Workers are allocated among a 
nationally representative set of synthetic 
firms. Each firm decides whether to 
offer ESI based on the aggregated 
preferences of their workers for 
having versus not having and ESI offer, 
additional costs of offering insurance, 
and minimum worker participation 
requirements. These synthetic firms 
also determine the risk pools for 
premiums. As a simplified example of 
why this is important for the present 
analysis, suppose a firm has 10 workers. 
Suppose also that 6 would prefer to 
take vouchers and 4 would be better 
off remaining in ESI. All 10 would 
prefer the firm to keep offering ESI, but 
insurers generally require take-up rates 
much higher than 40 percent Under a 
voucher approach, the firm would be 
unable to offer ESI, a situation affecting 
all 10 workers. A model that simulated 
individual choice only would not 
capture this important effect.
Under the House bill, employers offering 
ESI coverage to their workers would be 
required to contribute to premiums on a 
pro-rated basis for part-time employees.11 
In our simulation, the eligibility of part-
time workers for ESI and the size of the 
employer contributions for part-time 
employees are representative of those 
currently observed.12 Under the House 
bill rules, more part-time workers would 
be eligible for vouchers than simulated 
here. However, the voucher amounts 
would be far less for part-time workers 
than for full-time ones, so the additional 
eligibility is unlikely to change the 
results substantively.
There are two ways in which employers 
may change the benefits they provide 
to their workers in response to a 
voucher program. First, they may offer 
less comprehensive plans.13 Second, 
they may reduce the amount of their 
premium contributions. We were not 
able to model either effect in the current 
version of HIPSM. In practice, it is not 
clear that either change would actually 
be in the interests of a large number of 
employers since non-discrimination rules 
would require that they make the same 
contributions to all workers, thereby 
disadvantaging those higher income 
employees ineligible for subsidies.14
Figure 1.  2009 Health Insurance Coverage
0%
Baseline House bill House bill with  
Wyden-style  
Voucher
House bill with  
Expanded  
Voucher
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
nt
 o
f n
on
-e
ld
er
ly
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
Source: Urban Institute Analysis, HIPSM 2010 
Reforms simulated as fully implemented in 2009
Not insured Public insurance Non-group private insurance Private insurance 
through employer
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues 4
Results
Coverage
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the 
distribution of health insurance coverage 
prior to reform, under the House bill, 
under the House bill with a Wyden-style 
voucher option, and under the House 
bill with the expanded voucher option. 
The Wyden-style voucher would be 
available to those with ESI contributions 
between 8 and 12 percent of income, 
whereas the expanded voucher would 
be available to all workers with family 
incomes that fall in the subsidy eligibility 
range (133 to 400 percent of the FPL 
under the House bill). Changes in 
coverage follow the same basic pattern 
under both voucher programs. Those 
taking advantage of the vouchers would 
purchase nongroup coverage through 
the exchange using their vouchers 
and federal subsidies, decreasing the 
share of the population purchasing 
employer-based coverage and increasing 
the share buying nongroup insurance. 
There would be a 1.4 million person 
decrease in ESI coverage outside the 
exchange when Wyden-style vouchers 
are permitted and a 6.6 million person 
decrease under the expanded vouchers. 
Nongroup coverage (which, aside from 
grandfathered plans, would all be 
exchanged based under the House bill) 
would increase by 1.6 million and 6.4 
million, respectively, under the Wyden 
and expanded voucher approaches. 
These would be accompanied by very 
small increases in Medicaid/CHIP with 
the voucher options. The net result 
is that both voucher programs would 
cover slightly more people than the 
House bill alone, reducing the uninsured 
by an additional 200,000 under the 
Wyden-style voucher and an additional 
600,000 under the expanded voucher. 
Costs
Voucher programs would increase 
government costs only modestly as 
shown in table 2. Government costs 
would increase as more workers would 
enroll in exchange-based coverage, 
using the vouchers from their employers 
Table 1.  Health Insurance Coverage Distribution of Non-elderly in Baseline and Reform Under Various  
Policy Options
Baseline H.R.3962
H.R.3962 with  
Wyden-style Voucher
H.R.3962 with  
Expanded Voucher
Coverage (in millions)
Employer (Non-Exchange) 151.0 56.5% 141.4 52.9% 140.0 52.4% 134.8 50.5%
Non-Group (Non-Exchange) 15.7 5.9% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
Exchange Employer 0.0 0.0% 14.4 5.4% 14.0 5.2% 14.1 5.3%
Exchange Non-Group 0.0 0.0% 22.7 8.5% 24.3 9.1% 29.1 10.9%
Medicaid/CHIP 42.9 16.1% 65.1 24.4% 65.5 24.5% 66.2 24.8%
Other (including Medicare) 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2% 8.4 3.2%
Uninsured 49.1 18.4% 15.1 5.6% 14.9 5.6% 14.5 5.4%
Change in Coverage
Employer (Non-Exchange) -- -- -9.6 -3.6 -11.0 -4.1 -16.2 -6.1
Non-Group (Non-Exchange) -- -- -15.7 -5.9 -15.7 -5.9 -15.7 -5.9
Exchange Employer -- -- 14.4 5.4 14.0 5.2 14.1 5.3
Exchange Non-Group -- -- 22.7 8.5 24.3 9.1 29.1 10.9
Medicaid/CHIP -- -- 22.2 8.3 22.6 8.5 23.3 8.7
Other (including Medicare) -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uninsured -- -- -34.0 -12.7 -34.2 -12.8 -34.6 -13.0
Decline in uninsured -- 69.3% 69.8% 70.6%
Covered or eligible  
for public coverage
86.0% 96.6% 96.6% 96.7%
* Percentage point difference in coverage rate compared to baseline. 
Reforms simulated as if fully implemented in 2009
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
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Table 2.  Health Care Spending of Government, Employers, Individuals and Uncompensated Care  
in Baseline and Reform Under Various Policy Options (in billions)
H.R.3962
H.R.3962 with  
Wyden-style Voucher
H.R.3962 with  
Expanded Voucher
Total Government Spending (federal + state)
Baseline 246.8 246.8 246.8
Post-Reform Medicaid/SCHIP 308.9 309.3 311.0
Post-Reform Cost-sharing Subsidies 6.4 6.7 7.2
Post-Reform Premium Subsidies 25.5 26.4 27.1
Post-Reform Employer Subsidies 6.7 6.7 5.5
Post-Reform Individual Mandate 4.0 3.9 3.8
Post-Reform Free-rider Penalty 0.0 0.0 0.0
Net Post-Reform 343.5 345.3 347.1
Net Chng Post Reform 96.7 98.4 100.3
% Chng Post Reform 39.2% 39.9% 40.6%
Uncompensated Care
Baseline 61.1 61.1 61.1
Net Post-Reform 25.2 25.1 24.8
Net Chng Post Reform -35.9 -36.1 -36.4
% Chng Post Reform -58.7% -59.0% -59.5%
Employer Spending
Baseline 412.6 412.6 412.6
Post-Reform 423.8 419.4 403.7
Post-Reform Employer Subsidies 6.7 6.7 5.5
Post-Reform Free-rider Penalty 0.0 0.0 0.0
Post-Reform Voucher Amount 0.0 4.0 23.2
Net Post-Reform 417.2 416.6 421.3
 Net Chng Post Reform 4.6 4.0 8.7
 % Chng Post Reform 1.1% 1.0% 2.1%
Individual Spending
 Baseline 315.0 315.0 315.0
 Post-Reform 354.4 358.0 369.5
 Post-Reform Premium Subsidies 25.5 26.4 27.1
 Post-Reform Individual Mandate 4.0 3.9 3.8
 Post-Reform Voucher Amount 0.0 4.0 23.2
Net Post-Reform 332.9 331.5 323.0
 Net Chng Post Reform 17.9 16.5 8.0
      1.  <133% FPL -14.0 -14.3 -15.2
      2.  133-199% FPL -1.4 -2.1 -3.7
      3.  200-299% FPL 6.2 4.8 1.7
      4. 300%-399% FPL 7.1 6.6 2.8
      5. 400%+ FPL 19.7 20.2 19.5
 % Chng Post Reform 5.7% 5.2% 2.5%
Aggregate Change 83.2 82.9 80.7
* Other net government costs include subsidies to employers, less revenues from individual mandate penalties and free-rider penalties
Reforms simulated as if fully implemented in 2009
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
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but also taking advantage of available 
government subsidies. The government 
would spend $1.8 billion more with 
a Wyden-style voucher program than 
under the House bill without vouchers. 
This is a change in government 
spending of 0.5 percent relative to the 
net government costs of the House bill. 
The expanded voucher program would 
cost the government $3.7 billion more, 
a change of 1.1 percent relative to the 
House bill alone. 
The voucher amount is based on the 
highest-cost ESI plan offered by an 
employer and is applied to the premium 
of an exchange plan which would be 
much less comprehensive on average 
(70 percent actuarial value). The 
resulting voucher amounts would often 
be larger than the premium subsidies 
for which the family would have been 
eligible without an ESI offer. As a result, 
the cost of premium subsidies would not 
increase substantially. Some additional 
premium subsidies accrue to workers 
in the very small number of firms that 
stop offering coverage in the presence 
of vouchers. Many of those purchasing 
exchange-based coverage would also 
obtain cost-sharing subsidies, further 
lowering their out-of-pocket costs. A 
small increase in Medicaid enrollment 
would occur as well.
Voucher programs would have little 
effect on employer spending, since 
employers essentially spend the same 
amount on vouchers for their workers 
as they otherwise would have spent 
on ESI premium contributions for 
those workers. Under the Wyden-style 
program, employers would spend $4 
billion in vouchers, but would spend 
less on premium contributions. The 
net result would be $0.6 billion less 
spending on health care by employers 
than under the House bill without 
vouchers, a negligible percent change 
relative to net employer spending on 
health care. The expanded voucher 
program, not surprisingly, would greatly 
increase the amount spent on vouchers. 
Employers would spend, in total, $23.2 
billion on vouchers. When offset by 
decreases in premium contributions, 
employers would spend $4.1 billion 
more than under the House bill without 
vouchers, a change of less than 1 
percent. The dynamics producing 
these changes are complex, since firms 
must decide whether to offer ESI and 
individuals must decide whether to take 
a voucher if offered one. In general, 
wider eligibility for vouchers increases 
costs as more workers who would 
decline ESI instead take vouchers.
Finally, vouchers would reduce 
individual spending since families 
would have both employer contributions 
and government subsidies for use 
in purchasing coverage; without the 
vouchers they have only the employer 
contribution for use in purchasing 
ESI. Under a Wyden-style program, 
individuals would spend $1.4 billion less 
on health care than under the House bill 
without vouchers, a change of less than 
0.5 percent relative to net individual 
spending on health care. Individuals 
would save $9.9 billion under the 
expanded voucher program relative  
to the House bill alone, a change  
of 3 percent. 
Family Health Care Burdens
Table 3 shows that vouchers would 
make coverage more affordable for 
lower-income working families.15 
Financial burden is defined here as 
the share of income that a family 
spends on health care, including both 
insurance premiums and out-of-pocket 
Table 3.  Median Financial Burdens of Family Health Care Costs
H.R.3962 H.R.3962 with  
Voucher Program
Difference
Families with at least 1 person taking a voucher in H.R.3962 with Wyden-style Voucher 
Number of Persons (in millions) 1.1 1.1 0.0
Median Fiancial Burden 12.2% 2.6% -9.6
Families with at least 1 person taking a voucher in H.R.3962 with Expanded Voucher
Number of Persons (in millions) 6.5 6.5 0.0
Median Fiancial Burden
133-399% FPL 9.9% 3.6% -6.3
133–199% FPL 11.0% 1.3% -9.7
200–299% FPL 11.0% 2.9% -8.1
300–399% FPL 8.6% 4.7% -3.9
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
Reforms simulated as if fully implemented in 2009
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expenditures. We also deduct from 
these expenditures any voucher refunds 
accruing to those whose exchange-
based coverage costs less than the 
voucher amount. Since the voucher 
amount would not depend on income, 
the difference it would make in financial 
burdens would necessarily be larger 
for lower-income families than higher 
income families.
The first panel features those simulated 
to take a voucher under the Wyden-
style program. There would be 1.1 
million people in families in which 
at least one person would take a 
voucher. The median financial burden 
– premiums plus out-of-pocket costs 
– for such people under the House 
bill without vouchers would be 12.2 
percent of income. This would decrease 
dramatically to 2.6 percent of income 
with the vouchers. 
The second panel features those 
simulated to take a voucher under the 
expanded program. There would be 6.5 
million people in families in which at 
least one person would take a voucher. 
The median financial burden would be 
9.9 percent under the House bill without 
vouchers, decreasing to 3.6 percent 
with vouchers. We show further results 
by more detailed income category (the 
number of people in the previous panel 
is too small for further subdivision to 
give representative results).
Premiums
Table 4 shows that the voucher options 
would lead to a very modest amount 
of adverse selection in ESI premiums 
outside of the exchange. The more 
limited Wyden-style voucher program 
would increase ESI premiums by less 
than 0.5 percent on average compared 
to the House bill alone, while the 
expanded voucher program would 
increase ESI premiums by less than 1 
percent relative to the House bill alone. 
Adverse selection would occur for two 
main reasons. First, the lower actuarial 
value of the exchange plan as compared 
to the more comprehensive typical ESI 
plans would likely attract lower-cost 
families. Second, the exchange package 
would be most attractive to young adults 
because the exchange policies would  
be age rated.16 
The percentage of employers offering 
ESI is not affected much by the 
presence of voucher programs; there is 
a decrease of about 1 percentage point 
(data not shown). 
Discussion
In brief, our analysis found the 
following:
• Employee choice vouchers can 
substantially reduce health care 
burdens for lower-income working 
families. 
• The expanded voucher program 
would increase insurance coverage 
very modestly.
• The increased coverage would be 
achieved with relatively little increase 
in government costs.
• Voucher programs have little effect 
on overall employer spending on 
health care. Even under the expanded 
voucher program, the change in 
employer spending would be less 
than one percent, as new spending on 
vouchers essentially offsets employer 
contributions to ESI.
• Both voucher programs would have 
very little effect on ESI premiums, but 
would reduce the number of people 
covered by ESI outside the exchange. 
However, neither of these effects is 
large enough to threaten the integrity 
of the ESI market.
The employee choice provisions 
included in the Senate bill which 
would tie the size of the employee 
choice voucher to the employer’s most 
expensive health plan could, however, 
have some unintended effects. As 
mentioned earlier, employers may 
react to the introduction of such a 
Table 4. Average Single and Family ESI Premiums
Non-Exchange ESI Exchange ESI
Worker-Level Single 
Premium
Worker-Level Family 
Premium
Worker-Level Single 
Premium
Worker-Level Family 
Premium
Baseline $4,616 $11,517 -- --
H.R.3962 $4,502 $11,145 $4,185 $10,703
H.R.3962 with  
Wyden-style Voucher
$4,514 $11,191 $4,209 $10,831
H.R.3962 with  
Expanded Voucher
$4,536 $11,230 $4,075 $10,519
Reforms simulated as if fully implemented in 2009
Source:  Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
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voucher program by reducing the 
comprehensiveness of health insurance 
plans offered to their employees.
This concern could be addressed by 
allowing employers to compute their 
voucher amount using a plan more 
comparable to the standard exchange 
plan. Many large employers already offer 
multiple ESI plans; a provision such as 
this would encourage some to offer a 
plan option of similar actuarial value 
to the standard exchange plans. With 
the voucher amount tied to a somewhat 
lower cost option than the typical ESI 
plan, the incentive for younger healthier 
workers to leave employer-based 
coverage in order to obtain lower cost, 
less comprehensive coverage would be 
significantly reduced. 
Another option that would help 
ameliorate this concern is to increase 
the size of the employers eligible to 
purchase coverage through exchanges 
at the same time as expanding the 
voucher program. Larger employers 
could then offer coverage to their 
workers through the exchanges, 
providing vouchers for essentially 
identical coverage to those low-income 
workers who could take advantage of 
the additional subsidies available. 
Current health care reform bills would 
bar many lower-income working 
families offered ESI insurance from the 
financial assistance they could have 
received without such an offer. This 
analysis shows that voucher programs 
could redress this inequity and could do 
so with little change in employer and 
government costs and little disruption to 
employer-based insurance markets. 
Notes
1   H.R. 3962 was passed by the House on 7  
November 2009 and H.R. 3590 was passed  
by the Senate on 24 December 2009.
2   Refundable premium tax credits, in the language 
of the bills.
3   Under the Senate bill, exchange-based subsidies 
are available to eligible individuals with incomes 
between 100 and 400 percent of the FPL. 
4   Source: http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/
data_stats/summ_tables/insr/national/ 
series_1/2008/tic3.pdf; http://www.meps.ahrq.
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